The Social Medium Selection Game by Lebeau, Fabrice et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
1.
00
52
6v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  4
 Ja
n 2
01
6
The Social Medium Selection Game
Fabrice Lebeau∗†, Corinne Touati∗‡, Eitan Altman∗ and Nof Abuzainab∗
∗Inria ‡ CNRS, LIG, Univ. Grenoble Alpes †ENS Lyon
Email: fabrice.lebeau@ens-lyon.fr, {corinne.touati, eitan.altman, nof.abuzainab}@inria.fr
Abstract—We consider in this paper competition of
content creators in routing their content through various
media. The routing decisions may correspond to the selec-
tion of a social network (e.g. twitter versus facebook or
linkedin) or of a group within a given social network. The
utility for a player to send its content to some medium is
given as the difference between the dissemination utility
at this medium and some transmission cost. We model
this game as a congestion game and compute the pure
potential of the game. In contrast to the continuous case,
we show that there may be various equilibria. We show that
the potential is M-concave which allows us to characterize
the equilibria and to propose an algorithm for computing
it. We then give a learning mechanism which allow us to
give an efficient algorithm to determine an equilibrium. We
finally determine the asymptotic form of the equilibrium
and discuss the implications on the social medium selection
problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social networks involve many actors who compete
over many resources. This gives rise to competitions at
different levels which need to be taken into account in
order to explain and predict the system behavior. In this
paper, we focus on competition of individual content
creators over media. A content creator has to decide
which one of several media to use. The media choice
may correspond to a social network that will be used for
sending (and disseminating) some content. For instance,
the decision can consist in choosing between twitter and
facebook, or in deciding to which of several facebook
groups to send the content.
The game we study in this paper is atomic and non-
splitable. We consider a decision maker (or a player) to
be a single content instead. This regime can well ap-
proximate decision making where a content creator, say
a blogger, occasionally sends content. Here, occasionally
implies that the time intervals between generation of
consecutive contents by the blogger is large enough so
that the states of the system at the different times of cre-
ation of content are independent one from another. This
regime is interesting not only because it is characteristic
of systems with many sources of contents, but also
and foremost, it turns out that it precisely characterizes
bloggers that have more popularity and influence. This
was established experimentally in [1] which analyses the
role of intermediate actors in dissemination of content.
A similar game as the one in this paper was already
studied in [2] and [3], but there the players control rates
of creation of contents and/or decide how to split the
rates. The resulting games are simpler than ours as they
possess a single equilibrium. The model studied in this
paper brings many novelties both in the system behavior
as well as in the tools used to study it. The difficulty
in studying the game in our atomic non-splitable game
framework is due to the integrity constraint on the
players as they cannot split their content between several
media. This implies that the action space is discrete and
thus non convex which may result in problems in the
existence and/or uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Related work: Game theoretic models for com-
petition have been proposed in a growing number of
references. The authors of [4] focus on the competition
over budget of attention of content consumers and the
impact of this competition on the dynamic popularity of
the content. A game model related to intermediate actors
that participate in the spreading of news is considered
in [1]. The authors study how to choose the type and
amount of content to send so as to be influential. In [5],
the authors study competition over space among content
creators. The space may represent a slot (say the top
one) in a timeline, and a content that arrives occupies
the space pushing out the one that is already there. It
then stays visible there till the next arrival of content
that pushes it away. The authors study the timing game:
when should a content be sent to the timeline so as
to maximize the expected time it remain visible. The
authors of [6] study a dynamic competition model over
visibility in which the rate at which creator of contents
send their traffic is controlled.
Game theory has been used not only to model com-
petition in social networks but also to design algorithms
for the analysis of social networks [7]: this includes
community detection [8], discovery of influential nodes
[9] and more.
Contributions of our paper: Our first contribution is
to make the observation that the game complies with the
definition of congestion game introduced by Rosenthal
[10]. This allows us to show that our game is a potential
game, for which Nash equilibria exist. This further im-
plies that algorithms based on best response converge to
an equilibrium. We show that surprisingly, although the
potential approximates a strictly concave function (in the
continuous space), there may exist many equilibria. This
is quite a new phenomenon in networking games, and it
is due to the non convexity of the action space (due to the
non splitable assumption). In order to have uniqueness,
a new concept of integer concavity have to be used. We
rely on the theory of M-concavity [11] which allows
us to establish the structure of the set of equilibria
for this problem. We propose a learning algorithm that
converges to an equilibrium and is more efficient than the
best response algorithm. We finally study the asymptotic
behavior of the system as the number of players grows,
both in terms of characterization of the equilibria and in
price of anarchy.
II. MODEL AND NOTATIONS
We consider a set K = {1, ...,K} of seeds (content
producers, bloggers, etc) that aim to publish their content
in social media. We focus on the problem where each
seed needs to publish in some social medium j ∈ J =
{1, ..., J}. The strategy sk of seed k is the social medium
it selects for disseminating its content. Define the load
ℓj on social medium j as the number of competing seeds
that send their content to medium j. It can be written as
ℓj =
∑
k δ(sk, j) (δ is the Kronecker symbol, i.e. δ(a, b)
equals 1 if a = b and 0 otherwise). Assume that social
medium j has Nj > 0 subscribers who are interested in
content shipped to that medium.
The utility of a player (seed) is given as the difference
between a dissemination utility and a dissemination cost.
The former, that is, the value of disseminating a content
at the jth social network is (i) proportional to Nj and
(ii) inversely proportional to ℓj . Further, each seed pays
a constant dissemination cost γj for publishing on social
medium j.
This structure of utility is very common. In the
networking community, we find it in resource sharing
of link capacity for flow control problems. It is also
associated with the so-called Kelly mechanism (see [12]
for a similar utility in cloud computing), and models
tracing back to the Tullock rent-seeking problem [13].
In the social medium context, this utility naturally arises
if different seeds create similar content (say news) and
thus a subscriber is not interested in receiving more than
one content. This implies the structure of point (ii). The
use of this type of utility in competition for resources in
social networks can be found in [2].
Hence, the utility of seed k is given by
uk(~s) =
Nsk
ℓsk
− γsk , (1)
where ~s is the vector of strategies of the seeds ~s =
(sk)k∈K
For notational convenience, in the following we will
denote by S = JK the set of strategy profiles, and by
Γ = (K, (Nj , γj)j∈J) the game setting with K players
(the seeds), the set J of social media of parameters
((Nj , γj)j∈J) and the utility (uk)k∈K defined in Eq. (1).
Since the utility of each player (the seeds) only
depends on the number of users choosing the same action
(i.e. the same social media), the game is equivalent to a
congestion game in the sense of Rosenthal [10], where
the resources are the social media. It therefore is a
potential game [14], that is to say that there exists a
function Pot such that:
∀k ∈ K, ∀~s ∈ S, ∀sk,
uk(s1, ..., sk−1, s′k, sk+1, ..., sK)− uk(~s) =
Pot(s1, ..., sk−1, s′k, sk+1, ..., sK)− Pot(~s).
Let us introduce the Harmonic number: Hn =∑n
j=1 1/j if n ≥ 1 and Hn = 0 if n ≤ 0. Then, one can
readily check that a suitable potential of the game is:
Pot(~s) =
∑
j
(
NjHℓj − γjℓj
)
.
Let ~ℓ be the vector of loads induced by
~s and D the set of possible vector loads:
D =
{
(ℓ1, ..., ℓJ) ∈ NJ |
∑J
j=1 ℓj = K
}
. By using
the equivalence with the congestion game of [10] we
get the potential as a function of the loads ~ℓ ∈ D of the
social media:
Pot(~ℓ) =
∑
j
(
NjHℓj − γjℓj
)
.
Let us finally introduce the following notations that
will come in handy in the rest of the paper:
• For ~x ∈ Rn, supp+(~x) = {j | xj > 0} ,
• 〈 . | . 〉 is the euclidian scalar product over RJ :
〈 ~x | ~y 〉 =
∑
j xjyj ,
• ‖.‖∞ is the uniform norm: ‖~x‖∞ = maxj |xj |,
• (~ej)j is the Euclidean base of RJ .
2
III. DISCRETE POTENTIAL ANALYSIS
A. Nash equilibria
Potential games have received a lot of attention in the
past years as they draw a natural bridge between the
theory of games and optimization. Indeed, the definition
of a potential implies the following. A strategy profile
~s is a Nash equilibrium iff it is a maximizer of the
potential, that is,
∀~s, ∀k ∈ K ∀s′k ∈ J,
Pot(s1, ..., sk−1, s′k, sk+1, ..., sK) ≤ Pot(~s).
(2)
Note that a change of strategy of a seeds from social
media i to social media j amount in reducing the load ℓi
of network i and increase that of j by one unit. Hence,
in the space of load vectors, Equation (2) becomes:
∀i, j : ℓj > 0⇒ Pot(~ℓ+ ~ei − ~ej) ≤ Pot(~ℓ). (3)
For a given load vector ~ℓ, let V(~ℓ) be the set of pos-
sible load vectors obtained after the deviation of a sin-
gle player: V(~ℓ) =
{
~ℓ+ ~ei − ~ej | i, j ∈ J st ℓj > 0
}
.
Then, the Nash equilibria are all the strategy profiles ~s
for which the vector of loads is a local (in the sense of
V) maximum of Pot : D → R.
B. M-concavity
The potential is defined over a discrete set, and there-
fore classical convexity properties do not hold. In order
to understand the structural and uniqueness properties
of the Nash equilibrium, we study the properties of the
potential function in terms of M-concavity1.
Definition 1. A function f : ZJ → R is M-concave if
for all ~x, ~y in D and for all u ∈ supp+(~x− ~y):
∃v ∈ supp+(~y − ~x),
f(~x) + f(~y) ≤ f(~x− ~eu + ~ev) + f(~y − ~ev + ~eu).
We have the fundamental property:
Theorem 2. The function f : ZJ → R defined by:
f(~x) =
{
Pot(~x) if ~x ∈ D,
−∞ otherwise
is M-concave.
Proof. Let ~x, ~y ∈ D. First, if supp+(~x−~y) = ∅, then the
property is trivially true. Otherwise, assume that there is
1For more information about M-convexity, see [11, sec. 4.2].
some i in supp+(~x − ~y). If we had supp+(~y − ~x) = ∅
then we would also have∑
j
yj = yi +
∑
j 6=i
yj < xi +
∑
j 6=i
xj =
∑
j
xj = K.
This is absurd since ~y ∈ D. Hence supp+(~y − ~x) 6= ∅.
Then, let u ∈ supp+(~x − ~y) and v ∈ supp+(~y − ~x).
Since xu > yu ≥ 0 and yv > xv ≥ 0 we have that
~x− ~eu + ~ev and ~y − ~ev + ~eu are in D. Then:
f(~x− ~eu + ~ev) + f(~y − ~ev + ~eu)− f(~x)− f(~y)
= Nv
(
1
xv + 1
−
1
yv
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+Nu
(
1
yu + 1
−
1
xu
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
.
Note that since we did not choose a particular v in
the preceding proof, we have actually shown a much
stronger property, that is, that the inequality holds for
any v, which is decisive for the rest of the analysis:
∀~x, ~y ∈ D,
∀u ∈ supp+(~x− ~y), ∀v ∈ supp+(~y − ~x),
f(~x) + f(~y) ≤ f(~x− ~eu + ~ev) + f(~y − ~ev + ~eu).
(4)
C. Properties of the Nash equilibria
In this section, we show properties of the Nash equi-
libria of this game using the M-concavity of f .
Theorem 3. Let ~s ∈ S and let ~ℓ be the vector of loads
of ~s. Then:
~s is a Nash equilibrium for the game
⇔ ~ℓ maximizes globally the potential over D.
Proof. The sufficient condition is a direct consequence
of Eq. (3). Conversely, assume that ~s is a Nash equilib-
rium. Then, by (3), we know that ~ℓ is a local maximum
of Pot (over V(~ℓ)). Let u, v ∈ J:
If ~ℓ−~eu+~ev /∈ D then f(~ℓ) > f(~ℓ−~eu+~ev). Otherwise,
we have ~ℓ − ~eu + ~ev ∈ V(~ℓ). Hence ~ℓ satisfies the
property: ∀u, v ∈ J, f(~ℓ) ≥ f(~ℓ− ~eu + ~ev).
We then apply [11, Thm 4.6] with the M-concave
function f on ~ℓ, given that ~ℓ is a global maximum of
f . Therefore ~ℓ is a global maximum of Pot on D.
We show next that the set of loads corresponding
to the different Nash equilibria of the game, are all
neighbors of each other:
Theorem 4. Let EΓ be the set of the loads of the Nash
equilibria of the game. Then:
∀~x, ~y ∈ EΓ, ~x−~y =
∑
u∈supp+(~x−~y)
~eu−
∑
v∈supp+(~y−~x)
~ev.
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In other words, all Nash equilibria ~x, ~y ∈ EΓ satisfy
‖~x− ~y‖∞ ≤ 1.
Proof. First, if EΓ = {~x}, then the theorem is trivially
true. Otherwise, assume that there exists ~x, ~y ∈ EΓ
such that ‖~x− ~y‖∞ > 0. Since ~x and ~y are in D, we
can write ~x − ~y as ~x − ~y = ~eu − ~ev + ~z for some
u, v ∈ J and ~z ∈ ZJ satisfying u 6= v, 〈 z |~eu 〉 ≥ 0
and 〈 z |~ev 〉 ≤ 0. Therefore, we have u ∈ supp+(~x−~y)
and v ∈ supp+(~y − ~x).
Let ~a = ~x− ~eu+ ~ev and ~b = ~y− ~ev + ~eu. By Eq. (4)
we have: f(~x) + f(~y) = 2f(~x) ≤ f(~a) + f(~b). Hence
we get f(~a) = f(~b) = f(~x) by global maximality of
f(~x). Then f(~x) − f(~a) + f(~y) − f(~b) = 0, which in
turns implies that
Nu
xu
+
Nv
yv
=
Nu
yu + 1
+
Nv
xv + 1
.
Since xu ≥ yu + 1 and yv ≥ xv + 1, the last equation
implies that xu = yu + 1 and xv = yv − 1. Therefore:
~x− ~y =
∑
u∈supp+(~x−~y)
~eu −
∑
v∈supp+(~y−~x)
~ev.
Using this result, we can find a bound over the number
of Nash equilibria:
Proposition 5. For any setting Γ, the number of Nash
equilibria is upper bounded. More precisely, let EΓ be
the set of the loads of the Nash equilibria of Γ. Then:
|EΓ| ≤
(
J⌊
J
2
⌋).
Further, this bound is tight. Indeed, let J ≥ 2, m ∈ N∗
and γ ∈ R+. We define the game Γ by K = ⌊J2 ⌋ and
∀j ∈ J, Nj = m, γj = γ. Then |EΓ| =
(
J
⌊J2 ⌋
)
.
The proof of Proposition 5 is given in Appendix A.
Note that the bound is in O
(
2J√
J
)
and that it is
independent of the number of seeds K . As the number
of social media is typically small, then there is a limited
number of equilibria.
IV. ALGORITHMIC DETERMINATION OF AN
EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we see how to compute a Nash
equilibrium. Note that, from Theorem 5, computing all
the loads of the Nash equilibria would require Ω
(
2J√
J
)
operations. Further, for each load vector ~ℓ maximizing
Pot, computing all the corresponding Nash equilibria
~s ∈ S would require up to O(K!) operations because of
the symmetry of the game.
A. Maximization of the potential
Consider the following optimization mechanism:
Step 1) Start with some ~ℓ ∈ D
Step 2) Find ~ℓ∗ the argmax of Pot on V(~ℓ)
Step 3) If ~ℓ∗ = ~ℓ then stop
Step 4) Let ~ℓ = ~ℓ∗ and repeat from step 2)
Thanks to Theorem 3, we know that this mechanism
converges to a vector of loads of a Nash equilibrium.
From the point of view of the seeds, it is similar to
a guided best-response mechanism where at each step
the seed which could increase the most the potential by
changing its strategy is selected.
The problem is that, in the worst cases, this al-
gorithm visits all the load vectors of the domain D,
which leads to O
(
KJ
)
steps to find a maximum.
However, we can exploit the M-concavity of function
f to compute a Nash equilibrium in a far more effi-
cient way. To that end, we adapt the algorithm MODI-
FIED STEEPEST DESCENT given in [15, p.8] to our
problem, which is presented in Algorithm 1 below.
Algorithm 1: SD MAX
Input: Γ = (K, (Nj , γj)j∈J)
Output: A vector in EΓ
1 Let ~ℓ = K~e1 and ~b = 0 ∈ ZJ
2 while ∃u, ℓu − 1 ≥ bu do
3 Compute v ∈ argmaxt∈J
(
Nt
ℓt+1
− γt
)
4 bv ← ℓv + 1
5 ~ℓ← ~ℓ− ~eu + ~ev
6 return ~ℓ
Proposition 6. Algorithm 1 terminates, returns a vector
in EΓ with a time complexity in O
(
KJ2
)
.
Proof. We implemented the active domain B of the
algorithm used in [15, p.8] by a vector ~b satisfying:
B =

~x | ∑
u∈J
xu = K and ∀u ∈ J, xu ≥ bu

 .
We then remarked that we do not need to compute
the potential since v = argmaxt∈J f(~ℓ − ~eu + ~et) is
equivalent to:
∀t ∈ J, f(~ℓ− ~eu + ~ev)− f(~ℓ− ~eu + ~et) ≥ 0
⇔ ∀t ∈ J,
Nv
ℓv + 1
− γv −
Nt
ℓt + 1
+ γt ≥ 0
⇔ v = argmax
t∈J
(
Nt
ℓt + 1
− γt
)
.
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We can then apply the same analysis as in [15] for
the correctness of the algorithm.
The quantity 0 ≤
∑
u∈J(K − bu) ≤ KJ decreases by
at least one at each step of the algorithm. Therefore,
the algorithm terminates with at most KJ iterations.
Moreover, finding a u satisfying the loop condition and
computing the value of v can be done in O(J). Hence,
this algorithms has a time complexity in O
(
KJ2
)
.
We have also designed a refinement of this algorithm
thanks to some scaling properties of function f , which
gives a complexity in O
(
J3 logK/J
)
. It is omitted due
to length requirements.
B. An efficient learning mechanism
Note that the previous algorithm starts with some
arbitrary load vector in D and then iteratively finds the
best improvement until reaching a global maximum.
Instead, we propose a novel approach in which the
seeds arrive one by one. We then show that at each
arrival of seed k, the strategy sk can be computed in
such way that after all arrivals, the resulting vector ~s is a
Nash equilibrium. This approach relies on the following
theorem:
Theorem 7. Let Γ = (K, (Nj , γj)j∈J) be a setting of
the game and Γ′ = (K + 1, (Nj , γj)j∈J) be the setting
obtained by adding an extra seed on Γ. Let ~s be a Nash
equilibrium for Γ and ~σ the strategy profile of Γ′ in which
the K first seeds choose the same strategy as in ~s (i.e.
sk = σk for all k ≤ K) and the additional seed chooses
one of the social media which maximizes its payoff. Then
~σ is a Nash equilibrium for Γ′.
Formally, let ~ℓ ∈ EΓ be the load of some Nash
equilibrium of Γ and w ∈ J. Then
~ℓ+ ~ew ∈ EΓ′ ⇔ w ∈ argmax
t∈J
(
Nt
ℓt + 1
− γt
)
.
Proof. Let w ∈ argmaxt∈J
(
Nt
ℓt+1
− γt
)
. We proceed
to show that ~ℓ + ~ew is in EΓ′ .
Let u, v ∈ J such that ℓu+δ(u,w) > 0 and u 6= v. We
need to show that Pot(~ℓ+~ew) ≥ Pot(~ℓ+~ew−~eu+~ev).
There are three cases detailed below.
First, consider that u 6= w and v 6= w. Then Pot(~ℓ +
~ew)−Pot(~ℓ+~ew−~eu+~ev) = Pot(~ℓ)−Pot(~ℓ−~eu+~ev)
so it is proven in this case.
Second, consider that v = w. We have
Pot(~ℓ+ ~ew)− Pot(~ℓ+ ~ew − ~eu + ~ev)
= Pot(~ℓ + ~ew)− Pot(~ℓ+ 2~ew − ~eu)
=
Nu
ℓu
−
Nw
ℓw + 2
+ γw − γu
≥
Nu
ℓu
−
Nw
ℓw + 1
+ γw − γu ≥ 0
since ~ℓ ∈ EΓ.
Third, consider that u = w. We have
Pot(~ℓ+ ~ew)− Pot(~ℓ+ ~ew − ~eu + ~ev)
= Pot(~ℓ + ~ew)− Pot(~ℓ+ ~ev)
=
Nw
ℓw + 1
−
Nv
ℓv + 1
+ γw − γv ≥ 0
by definition of w.
The reciprocal follows from the last formula: if
Nw
ℓw+1
− γw was not maximal, then there would be some
v such that Pot(~ℓ + ~ew) < Pot(~ℓ + ~ev). Hence ~ℓ + ~ew
would not be in EΓ′ from Theorem 3.
We use Theorem 7 to build an efficient algorithm
finding a vector of loads of a Nash equilibrium (Algo-
rithm 2): it begins with no seed and simulates K times
the arrival of a seed maximizing its payoff.
Algorithm 2: ORDER LEARNING
Input: Γ = (K, (Nj , γj)j∈J)
Output: A vector in EΓ
1 Let ~ℓ = ~0 ∈ ZJ and k = 1
2 while k ≤ K do
3 Compute w ∈ argmaxt∈J
(
Nt
ℓt+1
− γt
)
4 ~ℓ← ~ℓ+ ~ew
5 k ← k + 1
6 return ~ℓ
Proposition 8. Algorithm 2 terminates and returns a
vector in EΓ with a time complexity in O(KJ).
Proof. Let Γk = (k, (Nj , γj)j∈J) for k ∈ {0, ...,K}.
Since ~0 ∈ ZJ is a vector of loads of a Nash equilibrium
of Γ0, then, from Theorem 7, at the end of the kth
iteration of the loop, ~ℓ is a vector of loads of a Nash
equilibrium of Γk, hence the correctness of Algorithm 2.
Since we can compute w in O(J) and there are
K iterations of the loop, then the time complexity of
Algorithm 2 is in O(KJ).
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V. ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR
In this section, we discuss the form of the Nash
equilibria when we have a lot more seeds than social
media, so K ≫ J . We are interested in this case
in practice as the activity in the Internet tend to be
concentrated in a restricted number of famous websites.
A. Intuition
First, we can make a hypothesis about the asymptotic
behavior of this game when K → ∞ according to the
form of the potential. Recall that Hn ∼
n→∞
ln(n) + µ,
where µ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. Then in order
to find approximate Nash equilibria, we can study the
function
P (~ℓ) =
∑
j, ℓj>0
(Nj ln(ℓj)− γjℓj) .
We can see that, for large values of ℓj , the linear part
in γjℓj is determinant compared to the logarithm part
in Nj ln(ℓj). Therefore we can make the hypothesis that
when the quantity
∑
j ℓj = K is large enough, then
the only ℓj that continue to increase are the ones with
minimal cost. Then, it seems natural that all social media
with minimal cost would behave as if they were in a
subgame where new seeds would only choose them.
B. Asymptotic Analysis
Following our hypothesis, we define γm the minimal
cost and G the set of social media with minimal costs:
γm = min
j
γj and G = argmin
j
γj .
We know, thanks to Theorem 7, that when K in-
creases, the coordinates of the loads of the Nash equi-
librium we consider can only increase. We proceed to
show our intuition. In the following, we note ΓK =
(K, (Nj , γj)j∈J) and EK = EΓK . We study the vectors
in EK obtained with the mechanism implemented in
Algorithm 2. Let ~ℓ(K) be the vector in EK obtained after
the Kth iteration of the loop in the algorithm.
Theorem 9. When K goes to infinity, at the Nash
equilibria, the social media are divided into two groups:
• The loads of the social media with non-minimal
cost stop increasing when they reach a constant.
Formally:
∀j ∈ J \G, ℓ
(K)
j −→
K→∞
⌈
Nj
γj − γm
⌉
− 1.
• The loads of the social media with minimal cost
goes to infinity, and the proportion of seeds a social
medium get among the one with minimal cost is
equal to its market share. Formally:
∀w ∈ G,
ℓ
(K)
w∑
t∈G ℓ
(K)
t
−→
K→∞
Nw∑
t∈GNt
.
The proof of Theorem 9 is given in Appendix B.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the convergence of the equilibrium
when the number of seeds K grows large. Note that
there may be up to 3 equilibria and that the plots of
the figure correspond to the outputs of Algorithm 2. The
asymptotes obtained in Theorem 9 are represented in
dashed lines with colors matching those of the loads of
their associated social media (SM). The SM 2 and 3,
which have minimal cost, have loads growing to infinity
with the number of seeds. The asymptote of SM 2 has a
higher slope than that of 3 because it has a higher number
of subscribers (N2 > N3). Finally, while for large values
of seeds the cost of the social media is predominant,
in contrast, for low values of seeds, the number of
customers M plays the larger role in determining the
loads of the different social media.
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Fig. 1. Convergence to the asymptotic behavior. Case with:
(N1, γ1) = (100, 2), (N2, γ2) = (25, 1) and (N3, γ3) = (20, 1).
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the social welfare,
that is, the sum of total utilities,
∑
k uk(~s), at the Nash
equilibrium and at the social optimum. The asymptotic
behavior at the Nash equilibria is given by −γmK from
Theorem 9. Further, let L = {j,Nj ≥ γj}. Recall
that the social optimum is the strategy vector maximiz-
ing the social welfare. Then, for K large enough, the
social optimum satisfies max~ℓ
∑
j,ℓj>0
(Nj − γjℓj) =∑
j∈L(Nj−γj)−γm(K−|L|) ∼ −γmK . Hence, as the
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Fig. 2. Sum of utilities at equilibrium compared with the social
optimum (same setting that Figure 1).
number of seeds grows to infinity, the price of anarchy
converges to 1.
Finally, Figures 3 and 4 show the sensitivity of the
equilibria with respect to N and γ for a case with J = 2
social media.
We observe that the load of a social medium is
increasing with its number of customers, as expected
(Fig. 3). Further, if the dissemination cost of SM 2 is
higher or equal to that of SM 1 and if it has no customer,
then its load is zero, as exhibited in the red and blue
plots. Otherwise, even though it has no customer, if its
cost is minimal, it will receive some seeds (green plot).
Finally, note that as the cost of SM 1 decreases, the
number of customers in the SM 2 has lower effect of
the evolution of the load ℓ2.
We also observe that the load of a social medium
is decreasing with its dissemination cost, as expected
(Fig. 4). Further, numerical results show that the load
decreases more abruptly for lower number of users N1,
but that the drop occurs for larger values of γ2.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied competition for pop-
ularity of seeds among several social media. We have
shown that the game is equivalent to a congestion
game and hence has a potential. We then studied the
properties of the potential in terms of M -concavity. We
have shown that there may exist several Nash equilibria,
all belonging to a single neighborhood and provided
examples where the number of equilibria is maximal. We
have provided a novel efficient learning algorithm based
on a remarkable property of the Nash equilibria in some
subgames. We also investigated the asymptotic behavior
of the equilibria of the game and the price of anarchy. As
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Lo
ad
ℓ 2
Number of users of SM 2: N2
γ1 = 15
γ1 = 10
γ1 = 5
Fig. 3. Influence of the number of users. Case with 2 social media:
N1 = 250, γ2 = 10 and K = 100.
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Fig. 4. Influence of the dissemination cost. Case with 2 social media:
γ1 = 30, N2 = 250 and K = 100.
future work, we will study the underlying competition
among the social media in the Stackelberg setting for
a discrete number of seeds: according to their number
of subscribers (who consume content), how could they
appropriately set up their prices? We further plan to
extend our model to the case where seeds have different
dissemination utilities for sending to the various media.
The game is no more equivalent to a congestion game but
turns out to be equivalent to crowding games [16]. This
allows to show existence of (pure) equilibria but best
response policies need not converge, as there need not be
a potential anymore. Thus, designing learning algorithms
for this extension is yet an open problem.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
A. Proof of the upper bound |EΓ| ≤
(
J
⌊ J2 ⌋
)
.
Lemma 10. Let ~x be a load vector at a Nash equilib-
rium, ~x ∈ EΓ, and u a social medium, u ∈ J. Then
(∃~y ∈ EΓ, xu > yu)⇒ (∀~z ∈ EΓ, xu ≥ zu) .
Proof. Assume that there exists ~y and ~z in EΓ such that
xu > yu and xu < zu. Then, by Theorem 4, yu = xu−1
and zu = xu + 1. Hence zu − yu = 2 which contradicts
Theorem 4.
Lemma 11. Let α ∈ J. Then
min(α,J−α)∑
k=0
(
α
k
)(
J − α
k
)
=
(
J
α
)
.
Proof. We show this result using a combinatorial argu-
ment. First, note that since
(
J
α
)
=
(
J
J − α
)
, then one
can restrict the analysis to the case where α ≤ J − α.
We want to select α elements in J. To do that, we
partition the set J into two subset A and B such that
|A| = α (so |B| = J − α).
Selecting α elements in J amounts to choosing k the
number of elements we select in B, then select these
k elements and finally select α − k elements in A.
Therefore(
J
α
)
=
|A|∑
k=0
(
|B|
k
)(
|A|
α− k
)
=
α∑
k=0
(
α
α− k
)(
J − α
k
)
=
min(α,J−α)∑
k=0
(
α
k
)(
J − α
k
)
.
We can now proceed to the proof of Theorem 5:
Proof. Let ~x ∈ EΓ and:
U = {u | ∃~y ∈ EΓ, xu > yu} =
⋃
~y∈EΓ
supp+(~x− ~y) and
V =
⋃
~y∈EΓ
supp+(~y − ~x).
By Lemma 10, we have U ∩V = ∅ and |U|+ |V| ≤ J .
We then define the set A =
{~x}∪
min(|U|,|V|)⋃
k=1

~x−∑
u∈C
~eu +
∑
v∈D
~ev
∣∣∣∣∣
C ⊂ U ,
D ⊂ V ,
|C| = |D| = k

 .
We know by Proposition 5 and Lemma 10 that all
vectors in EΓ are of the form given in the previous
expression, hence EΓ ⊂ A.
Let α = |U|. We have |V| ≤ J − α. Then
|EΓ| ≤ |A| = 1 +
min(|U|,|V|)∑
k=1
(
|U|
k
)(
|V|
k
)
≤ 1 +
min(α,J−α)∑
k=1
(
α
k
)(
J − α
k
)
.
We conclude the proof by applying Lemma 11,
using the increasing property of function
(
J
.
)
over
{0, ..., ⌊J/2⌋} and the fact that
(
J
p
)
=
(
J
J−p
)
for all p:
|EΓ| ≤
(
J
α
)
≤
(
J⌊
J
2
⌋).
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B. A Tight Class of Settings
Let J ≥ 2, m ∈ N∗ and γ ∈ R+. We define the game
Γ by K =
⌊
J
2
⌋
and ∀j ∈ J, Nj = m, γj = γ.
Lemma 12. The Nash equilibria of game Γ satisfy the
property:
~ℓ ∈ EΓ ⇒ ∃A ⊂ J, |A| =
⌊
J
2
⌋
and ~ℓ =
∑
u∈A
~eu.
Proof. Assume that there exists ~x ∈ EΓ and u ∈ J such
that xu > 1. Since K < J , there exists v ∈ J such that
xv = 0. Consider the vector ~y = ~x− xu~eu + xu~ev.
Since all the Nj and γj are equal, the potential of ~y
is equal to the potential of ~x. Therefore ~y ∈ EΓ. But we
have yv − xv = xu > 1 which contradicts Theorem 4
and concludes the proof.
Since EΓ 6= ∅, let ~x ∈ EΓ. By Lemma 12, we can note
~x =
∑
u∈A ~eu for some A ⊂ J. Let B ⊂ J verifying
|B| =
⌊
J
2
⌋
and ~y =
∑
v∈B ~ev. Then, we have
Pot(~x) =
∑
u∈A
(m− γ) =
⌊
J
2
⌋
(m− γ)
=
∑
v∈B
(m− γ) = Pot(~y).
Therefore, |EΓ| =
∣∣∣∣
{
A ⊂ J | |A| =
⌊
J
2
⌋}∣∣∣∣ =
(
J⌊
J
2
⌋).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THE ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR
Note that, by definition of the learning mechanism
implemented in Algorithm 2, for all K ∈ N and j ∈ J
we have
ℓ
(K+1)
j = ℓ
(K)
j +1⇒ j ∈ argmax
t∈J
(
Nt
ℓt + 1
− γt
)
. (5)
A. Social media with non minimal cost
We want to prove that
∀j ∈ J \G, ℓ
(K)
j −→
K→∞
⌈
Nj
γj − γm
⌉
− 1. (6)
We begin by proving the following two lemmas.
Lemma 13. The quantity
M (K) = max
t∈J
(
Nt
ℓ
(K)
t + 1
− γt
)
is arbitrarily close to γm for K large enough2.
2We denote by K “large enough” the fact that there exists some K0
such that the property is verified for all K > K0.
Proof. First, this quantity is decreasing. Moreover, by
definition of the ~ℓ(K), we have that for all K ,
∑
j
ℓ
(K)
j =
K −→
K→∞
∞. Therefore, there exists some u ∈ J such that
ℓ
(K)
u −→
K→∞
∞. It means that there exists (Kn)n∈N such
that ∀n, ℓ(Kn+1)u = ℓ(Kn)u +1, which implies by (5) that
∀n, Nu
ℓ
(Kn)
u +1
− γu =M (Kn).
Hence M (Kn) is arbitrarily close to −γu for n large
enough. We conclude by noticing that −γu ≤ −γm.
Lemma 14. Let K > 0 and u ∈ J. Then
Nu
ℓ
(K)
u + 1
− γu > −γm ⇔ ∃K
′>K, ℓ(K
′)
u > ℓ
(K)
u .
Proof. First, assume that Nu
ℓ
(K)
u +1
− γu ≤ −γm. Then for
some w ∈ G and for all K ′ ≥ K we have
Nu
ℓ
(K)
u + 1
− γu <
Nw
ℓ
(K′)
w + 1
− γw
since γw = γm. This implies that Nu
ℓ
(K)
u +1
−γu < M (K
′)
.
Therefore, for all K ′ > K , (5) leads to ℓ(K′)u = ℓ(K)u .
Then assume that Nu
ℓ
(K)
u +1
− γu > −γm. According to
Lemma 14, M (K′) is arbitrarily close to −γm for K ′
large enough. Therefore there exists K ′ > K such that
M (K
′) <
Nu
ℓ
(K)
u + 1
− γu. Hence ℓ
(K′)
u > ℓ
(K)
u which
concludes the proof.
We can now proceed with the proof of (6).
Let j ∈ J \ G. We know by Lemma 14 that ℓ(K)j
increases with K as long as Nj
ℓ
(K)
j + 1
− γj > −γm.
Therefore, for K large enough we have
ℓ
(K)
j = 1 +max
{
p ∈ N |
Nj
p+ 1
− γj > −γm
}
.
Then, let p ∈ N. Since j ∈ J \G, we have γj > γm.
We solve Nj
p+ 1
−γj > −γm ⇔ p+1 <
Nj
γj − γm
. Hence
ℓ
(K)
j + 1 =
⌈
Nj
γj − γm
⌉
which concludes the proof.
B. Social media with minimal cost
We can directly conclude from Lemma 14 that the
load of any social medium having a minimal cost goes
to infinity as K increases. Formally:
∀w ∈ G, ℓ(K)w −→
K→∞
∞. (7)
Now we proceed to find the values of ℓ(K)w for the
social media with minimal cost. Let K be large enough
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so that (6) is verified. Let KG = K−
∑
j∈J\G
ℓ
(K)
j be the
number of seeds sharing the social media in G and
DG =
{
(xt)t∈G |
∑
t∈G
xt = KG and ∀t ∈ G, xt > 0
}
.
Consider the game ΓG = (KG, (Nt, γm)t∈G).
From (7), the loads of the social media in G can be
arbitrarily high with K large enough, so we determine
an approximation of a load of a Nash equilibrium for
the social media in G by solving
max
~x∈RG
P (~x) =
∑
t∈G
(Nt ln(xt)− γmxt) s.t. ~x ∈ DG.
Since P is concave, we apply a Lagrangian maximiza-
tion method. Let L be the Lagrangian for this problem:
L(~x, λ)=P (~x)− λ
(∑
t∈G
xt −KG
)
,
where λ and the xt are nonnegative.
Since P is concave, the unique maximum ~x∗ verifies
∀t ∈ G,
∂L
∂xt
(~x∗) = 0. Therefore, we get that for any t:
Nt
x∗t
− γm − λ = 0⇔ x
∗
t =
Nt
γm + λ
.
Now we determine the value of λ:∑
t∈G
x∗t = KG ⇒
∑
t∈G
Nt
γm + λ
= KG
⇒ λ =
1
KG
(∑
t∈G
Nt
)
− γm.
Hence ∀w ∈ G, x∗w = KG Nw∑
t∈G
Nt
.
Thanks to (7) and since Hn−µ ∼
n→∞
lnn, we finally
get that ∀w ∈ G, ℓ
(K)
w∑
t∈G ℓ
(K)
t
−→
K→∞
Nw∑
t∈GNt
.
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